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TO SERVE AND YET TO BE PROTECTED: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF COERCED STATEMENTS
IN SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS'
A police department has caught wind of rumors that certain
members of its narcotics division receive kickbacks from the bolder
drug dealers around town. The internal affairs division has reason
to believe that Sergeant Smith, head of the department's cocaine
task force, receives the lion's share of these kickbacks. An internal
affairs officer approaches Corporal Jones, Smith's longtime part-
ner. She begins by administering a Garrity statement2 to Jones in
order to discover what, if anything, he knows about the affair.
Her statement takes the following form: "I am going to ask you
some narrowly-tailored questions related to your knowledge of the
alleged bribes paid to members of this department who we are cur-
rently investigating. During the course of this questioning, you
maintain all rights that the U.S. Constitution guarantees you, in-
cluding the privilege against self-incrimination. If, however, you re-
fuse to answer, the department will institute disciplinary action
against you, including the possibility of termination of employ-
ment. If you do respond, the statements which you give will not be
used against you in any future criminal proceeding." Desirous of
keeping his job, Jones answers to the best of his ability The re-
sponses of the officer, along with statements that others make in
connection with this investigation, comprise a file kept by the in-
ternal affairs division.
Later, the attorney general convenes a grand jury in order to in-
quire further into the corruption in the department. The grand
jury immediately issues a subpoena duces tecum to the head of the
internal affairs division, ordering her to produce the file relating to
1. I am indebted to C. John Pleban, Esq., and Judith Ronzio, Esq., of the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department for their insights into the process underlying internal
affairs investigations conducted by police departments and to Laura Livaccari for her
unflagging support.
2. The term "Garrity statement" derives from Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967),
discussed in detail infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
its investigation. Though refusing to produce the Garrity state-
ments which the department promised to safeguard, she offers to
produce a sanitized version of the file.' With its broad subpoena
power at hand, the eager grand jury refuses to accept this offer.
This hypothetical scenario plays out regularly in police depart-
ments around the country A recent and recognizable example is
found in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating incident.
Weeks after the episode, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents who were looking into possible civil rights abuses ran into a
stone wall.4 Many of the officers who initially submitted volunta-
rily to interviews with FBI agents, later ended the discussions with
a declaration that their statements were extracted under duress.5
"[T]he fact that one law-enforcement agency is investigating an-
other has focused attention on the thorny issue of a [sic] officer's
professional duty to serve the law versus his legal right to protect
himself against self-incrimination." 6 The guarantee that the FBI
would immunize the officers from criminal prosecution may mean
that the officers would be required constitutionally to speak, but
this fact only begs the questions of who would grant immunity and
from what portion of the criminal proceeding the officers would
receive insulation.
To decide whether the grand jury should have access to the co-
erced statements of police officers demands an inquiry into the na-
ture of the statements themselves. This Note will argue that courts
essentially should equate the testimony which the coercive tech-
nique of an internal affairs division produces with its own order to
compel testimony First, this Note analyzes the validity of the doc-
trine that the Supreme Court tacitly set forth in the 1960's, effec-
tively allowing coerced statements taken from police officers pursu-
ant to internal investigation to pass constitutional muster.8 The
3. In all likelihood, the department initially will refuse to produce any part of the file for
the grand jury in an attempt to maintain the integrity and secrecy of the internal affairs
division. This Note, however, will focus attention only on the statements coerced from of-
ficers pursuant to an internal affairs investigation.
4. See Officers' Rights Hinder F.B.L Inquiry into Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1991,
§ 1, at 8.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
8. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:401
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF COERCED STATEMENTS
statements, although coerced and potentially in violation of the of-
ficer's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,' were
acceptable to the Court as long as they were not introduced into
the criminal proceeding. 10
Assuming the validity of the Garnty doctrine, this Note then
will address the use of such statements in the context of the grand
jury proceeding.1" Part II of this Note will inquire into the nature
of the grand jury in order to answer whether the grand jury is in-
deed a part of the criminal proceeding. 2 If so, statements coerced
from officers would be excluded automatically from their hearing
according to the conventional constitutional standard." On the
other hand, even if the grand jury is merely an investigatory body,
this Note will argue that policy considerations often will preclude
grounding an indictment in coerced testimony which may be un-
available at trial.14 In order to shed light on the role of the grand
jury, this Note will analyze the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Williams 5 and will discuss the current, slightly
confused interpretation of the grand jury's role in the criminal
proceeding."6
Part III of this Note will examine the similarity of immunities
and privileges that the court already recognizes at the grand jury
level to the coerced Garnty statement.17 Part IV will suggest policy
justifications for treating Garrity statements in a fashion similar to
other immunities and privileges.' 8 Premised on the fact that the
9. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination guarantees that no one
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST.
amend. V
10. See Gardner, 392 U.S. 273; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
11. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 50-151 and accompanying text.
13. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. This finding would assume a literal reading of the Fifth
Amendment.
14. For example, if a grand jury were to base an indictment purely on inadmissible evi-
dence and the government failed to unearth other evidence against the defendant, the trial
court would likely dismiss the case at the close of the government's case-in-chief. Such a
procedure would waste judicial resources and place an unnecessary burden on the
defendant.
15. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
16. See infra notes 116-51 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 152-236 and accompanying text.
18. See znfra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court tacitly has delineated a method by which police
departments can coerce statements from their officers, this Note
proposes that a grant of immunity or recognition of a privilege co-
extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation represents the only method by which the grand jury consti-
tutionally may gain access to coerced testimony 19
Because of the often muddled state of privileges analysis and the
difficult question of whether a police department has standing to
assert an officer's Fifth Amendment privilege, this Note will pro-
pose the use of a "projected privilege," designed to protect the
rights of officers while allowing departments to conduct internal
investigations.2 0 This approach would vindicate the public desire
for an honest, law-abiding police force without frustrating individ-
uals' constitutional rights. The information contained in a Garrity
statement is of substantial value to the government in its attempt
to prosecute officers who have run afoul of the law. Permitting the
use of such information in grand jury investigations, however,
would discourage officers from complying with internal investiga-
tions and thus would thwart the attempts of police departments to
police themselves. In addition, admission of the testimony without
any duty to protect the testifying officer would violate the most
basic tenets of the Fifth Amendment privilege. This Note attempts
to bridge this gap in current jurisprudence and argues that this
violation of testifying officers' Fifth Amendment rights demands
the attention of the Supreme Court.
19. The interesting problem presented by the form deemed constitutionally permissible
for the Garrity statement is that a police department may coerce the statement from the
officer provided that the fruits thereof are not used in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
See infra notes 152-95 and accompanying text.
The police department, however, is not the body that has the ability to use these state-
ments in a future criminal proceeding; the government makes the selection. The standard
application of the Garrity statement, therefore, raises an issue on which this Note will
dwell-who has the duty and the power to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of the officer
once he or she has given a statement.
20. Professor Kevin Reitz proposed the use of a projected privilege to permit an attorney
to assert her client's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in certain cases.
Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected
Privilege, 41 DuKc L.J. 572, 651-54 (1991). See infra notes 196-236 and accompanying text
for a detailed discussion of the projected privilege and its application to the police depart-
ment-law enforcement officer context.
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Despite the long lapse since the Court last visited the Garnty
statement issue, it appears regularly in the headlines.2' Perhaps
most notably, a superior court judge in California ruled that the
disciplinary hearings conducted against Los Angeles police officers
involved in the Rodney King beating would be public with one ex-
ception: the court excluded statements that internal investigators
coerced from Officer Laurence Powell that would jeopardize the
fairness of his retrial.22 The prosecutors and Powell's attorney
reached an agreement endorsed by the judge to prevent admission
of statements Powell made under a threat of dismissal .2  As the
scrutiny under which this country places its police officers intensi-
fies, the need to revisit these issues in order to guarantee effective
law enforcement will continue to grow.
BACKGROUND OF THE GARRITY STATEMENT
Two Supreme Court decisions handed down in the 1960's, Gar-
rity v. New Jersey24 and Gardner v. Broderick,25 created the theo-
retical basis for the Garrity statement as used today In Garrity,
the Court addressed whether statements of police officers who were
under threat of dismissal were given involuntarily, and if so,
whether the State's use of such statements was a violation of an
individual's privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment.26
In Garrity, the attorney general of New Jersey had launched an
investigation into irregularities in the disposition of traffic offense
cases.27 Before questioning several New Jersey police officers, the
attorney general warned each of them that anything they said
21. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text; see also Public Employees; Discharge of
Policeman-Procedural Due Process, MicH. LAw. WKLY., Nov. 30, 1992, at 6 (describing a
recent Michigan case in which an officer sued his former department for constitutional vio-
lations in his discharge, including the use of coerced statements in his disciplinary hearing
and criminal prosecution).
22. Leslie Berger, LAPD Hearings in King Case to be Open; Police: Public will be Admit-
ted to Disciplinary Proceedings for Officers Charged in Beating. Some Coerced Statements
May be Kept Private Because of Powell's Pending Trial, LA, TiMEs, June 20, 1992, at B3.
23. Id.
24. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
25. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
26. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496-500.
27. Id. at 494.
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could be used against them and that they had the privilege to re-
fuse to respond if answering would tend to incriminate them, but if
they so refused, they would be subject to removal from office.2 s
The officers answered the questions.29 Unfortunately for them, no
applicable statute prohibited the use of their testimony in subse-
quent proceedings.30 The government used some of the answers in
subsequent prosecutions, resulting in the conviction of the appel-
lant-officers.31
In holding that the statements were inadmissible,3 2 the Court fo-
cused its attention on the nature of the officers' statements.3 3 Find-
ing that coercion could include both mental and physical forms of
influence, 4 the Court described the officers' lack of choice: "[t]he
option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of
28. Id. A New Jersey state statute authorized the removal of state officials and employees
in the event that they "refuse[d] to testify upon matters relating to thefir] office, position or
employment," even when asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (1965), repealed by Act effective May 21, 1970, ch. 72,
§ 7, 1970 N.J. Laws 381. New Jersey law currently imposes a duty upon public officials to
testify before several bodies, including grand juries and courts. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-
17.2al (1976). Failure to provide testimony subjects the employee to removal from office. Id.
The section also guarantees the equivalent of both use and derivative use immunity: "[i]f
any public employee testifies before any court [or] grand jury such testimony and
the evidence derived therefrom shall not be used against such public employee in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding." N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.2a2 (1976). This language closely
tracks the holdings in Garrity and in Gardner See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying
text.
29. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495.
30. Id. See znfra notes 196-236 and accompanying text for a discussion of the availability
of a "projected" privilege.
31. Id. at 495.
32. Id. at 500.
33. Id. at 496.
34. Id. "'[T]he blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional in-
quisition.' "Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)). The dissent, how-
ever, took issue with the majority's characterization. Id. at 500-01 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan argued that the majority, in finding coercion, necessarily decided that the
statements were coerced as a matter of fact because they were given involuntarily. Id. at
501. He further asserted that the majority found the statements inadmissible because the
department placed an unallowable condition on the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
Justice Harlan disagreed with both contentions, finding that the threat of dismissal was
insufficient to bar the use of such questioning under either theory. Id. at 502-09. "The ma-
jority is apparently engaged in the delicate task of riding two unruly horses at once: it is
presumably arguing simultaneously that the statements were involuntary as a matter of
fact, and that the statements were inadmissible as a matter of law." Id. at 501 (citations
omitted).
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self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to
remain silent. ' 35 Due to the coercive environment in which the in-
terrogation took place, the Court held that the statements were in-
voluntary as a matter of law;36 the fact that the officers ultimately
chose to speak did not make the statements which ensued "volun-
tary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 7
Deciding that the police officers did not give the statements vol-
untarily did not end the Court's inquiry into whether the depart-
ment violated the rights of the officers. No violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination occurs until the
coerced statement is used against the declarant in a criminal pro-
ceeding.38 Thus, the Court held that the protection against coerced
statements prohibits their use in "subsequent criminal
proceedings." 9
One year later in Gardner v. Broderick,0 the Court built upon
the theory of Garrity which had prohibited the use of coerced
statements at trial.41 In Gardner, a New York County grand jury
subpoenaed Gardner, a police officer, to testify concerning his in-
volvement in alleged bribery and corruption in the New York City
35. Id. at 497.
36. Id. at 497-98.
37. Id. at 498-99.
38. Logically speaking, a person cannot incriminate herself in a context other than a crim-
inal proceeding. That is, a criminal proceeding is a necessary element of a Fifth Amendment
violation; the mere taking of a statement will not constitute a violation of the right against
self-incrimination. This point throws into question precisely who violates the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege: the department by taking the statement through coercive techniques or the
grand jury by using it. In fact, the police department cannot be the culprit for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court effectively has given police departments permission to conduct
coercive questioning through its holdings in Garrity and Gardner. Second, the grand jury is
the body that forces the introduction of the statement into a judicial proceeding, creating
the first infringement on the Fifth Amendment privilege.
39. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. The Court did not say that the interdiction against use in
subsequent criminal proceedings was limited to use against the giver of the statement. Id.
This fact raises the question whether the Court intended to limit its holding to prohibit use
of coerced statements against the speaker, or if it intended to exclude the use of the state-
ment against any potential party to a criminal action. Although the latter is intuitively more
attractive after a reading of the opinion, the former provides the likely answer in current
jurisprudence. See infra notes 152-81 and accompanying text (discussing use and derivative
use immunity).
40. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
41. The Court's dicta in Gardner provided the framework that police departments still
use today to interrogate their officers. See infra notes 48-49 and accomapnying text.
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Police Department.42 The assistant district attorney first advised
Gardner of his privilege against self-incrimination, but then re-
quired that he sign a "waiver of immunity"; his failure to acquiesce
would result in termination from employment.4 Upon his refusal,
Gardner underwent an administrative hearing, ending in his
dismissal."
The Court asserted that its holding in Garnty was not precisely
on point.45 Garnty had related to the attempt to coerce and ulti-
mately to use testimony given upon threat of discharge whereas
Gardner raised the question whether the discharge of an officer for
the refusal to waive a constitutionally guaranteed right was consti-
tutionally permissible.46 Faced with the refusal to sign a "waiver of
immunity," the Court found that requiring Gardner to forego his
constitutional privilege on threat of dismissal violated his right
against self-incrimination.47
In dicta, the Court outlined the requirements that police depart-
ments all over the country have incorporated into their internal
investigatory scheme.48
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions spe-
cifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of
his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity
with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution of himself the privilege against self-
incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal.49
The implication of the Garnty and Gardner decisions taken in
tandem is twofold: the Fifth Amendment will tolerate neither the
use of coerced statements and their fruits in a criminal proceeding
42. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 274-75. The hearing was conducted pursuant to the New York City Charter, ch.
49, § 1123.
45. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 277.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 278.
48. For example, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department routinely administers
what the internal affairs division calls a "Garrity statement" similar to the one outlined in
the hypothetical that introduced this Note. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
49. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278 (citation omitted). Use immunity and derivative use immu-
nity are both implicated in this statement of the correct procedure. See infra notes 152-81
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:401
1993] UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF COERCED STATEMENTS
nor the requirement that officers waive their privilege against self-
incrimination. The glaring fact remains that police departments do
not prosecute, so they are unable to ensure that the statements
that they coerce under authority of Garrity will not be used
against an officer in a later proceeding. This situation effectively
forces a waiver of the privilege that Garrity and Gardner both
claim to protect.
USE OF THE GARRITY STATEMENT IN A GRAND JURY PROCEEDING
Even more problematic is the question of grand jury access to
the coerced statements of law enforcement officials contained in
internal affairs files. Grand juries have long enjoyed broad sub-
poena power.5 0 No Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed
whether a grand jury may use the fruits of a Garrity statement in
its proceedings. Recently, however, the Court rendered a decision
that attempted to define the scope and duties of the grand jury "I
Over the decades, the Court has vacillated in its characterization of
the grand jury52 and has never held explicitly that it is an investi-
gatory body, utterly free of the constraints of an adjudicatory
body This issue forms the point of departure for a discussion of
whether a grand jury, once convened, is part of the "criminal pro-
ceeding" in which a Garrity statement may not be heard.
The Power of the Grand Jury to Trespass on Fundamental Rights
Several times the Supreme Court has held that a witness may
not refuse to testify merely because investigators based their ques-
tions on evidence that would be inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment." The Court's justification for this holding is that the
50. For example, in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court analyzed the historical
necessity of the liberal powers of investigation and subpoena that a grand jury holds. The
purpose of the power is to allow the grand jury access to "everyman's evidence." Id. at 70.
In other words, the prosecutorial system allows access to information that would not be
admissible at trial in order to carry out investigatory responsibilities unimpeded.
51. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742-44 (1992).
52. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (discussing the history of the role of the
grand jury in both England and the United States and concluding that the grand jury has
both investigatory and adjudicatory traits).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that the exclusion-
ary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of illegally seized evidence in
all proceedings or against all persons, despite its broad deterrent purpose); United States v.
409
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grand jury must have broad investigative power in order to carry
out its duties.5 4 The common sense question that follows, however,
is of what use this information can be assuming that the response
and the fruits thereof will never be admissible at trial. Specifically,
an indictment based purely, or even in large part, on evidence not
admissible at trial55 ultimately appears to serve little purpose to
the criminal justice system. Unless the government finds another
source of evidence, separate and apart from the officer's statement,
the court will not permit its use at trial.5 6
The Basic Role of the Grand Jury in the American Criminal
Justice System
The most basic, and perhaps most overworked, definition of the
purpose of the grand jury proposes that it must act as the schizo-
phrenic "shield and sword" of the criminal justice system. 57 As
a shield, the grand jury must protect individuals in the event that
the prosecutor requests an indictment without sufficient evidence
to warrant a trial.5 8 The grand jury assumes the role of a sword
when examining situations at the investigatory stage.59 In the lat-
Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.3 (1966) (stating that a defendant may suppress no more than
incriminating evidence that the government acquires in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
and the fruits thereof); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (validating an indict-
ment handed down by a 1953 grand jury based entirely on evidence coerced by a 1952 grand
jury in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights).
54. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344.
55. For example, an indictment resting on statements taken in derogation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
56. If the officer invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege before the grand jury, the court
will ultimately grant the officer use immunity coextensive with her Fifth Amendment rights
in exchange for forcing her to testify. See generally Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1991) (discussing the unfor-
tunate protection of what he calls "truth-impairing" rights); Gary S. Humble, Noneviden-
tary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 TEx. L. REV. 351
(1987) (arguing that the federal immunity statute and its use to overcome a witness' Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination amounts to transactional immunity because
of the burden on the government to show that it made neither evidentiary nor noneviden-
tiary use of the compelled testimony).
57. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.1, at 376 (2d ed.
1992).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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ter role, the grand jury unearths evidence, thus helping the govern-
ment to obtain a conviction. °
Although grand jury investigations are time-consuming and
cumbersome,61 they generally are much more productive than the
immediate commencement of a trial upon the first suspicion fo-
cused against the defendant. The greatest advantage of the grand
jury is its subpoena power enhanced by the potential for contempt
sanctions and grants of immunity 62 The grand jury may subpoena
both live testimony and tangible evidence, and subject those who
refuse to comply to civil or criminal contempt.63 The threat of a
contempt order is particularly useful in obtaining information from
potential witnesses who refuse to cooperate with police by invoking
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.6 Often
the fear of spending time in jail in itself will cause the witness to
speak freely 65 The witness, however, can continue to invoke the
privilege and risk criminal contempt sanctions.6
To avoid this problem, the prosecutor will often grant immu-
nity6" against future prosecution to a witness sufficient to overcome
the invoked privilege.6 8 Once the prosecutor grants a witness im-
munity, the witness may no longer rely on the privilege against
self-incrimination. Prosecutors will often grant immunity to a
"lower-level" participant in a crime in the hope of obtaining testi-
mony against the greater offenders. 70 For this reason, the grant of
60. Id. at 376-77.
61. Id. § 8.3, at 382.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 8.3(a), at 382-83.
64. Id. § 8.3(b), at 383.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Specifically, the prosecutor will grant a "use" immunity, as opposed to a "transac-
tional" immunity. The modern use immunity avoids a violation of the Fifth Amendment by
forbidding the use of any testimony compelled by the court order against the defendant. See
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). The use immunity narrowed the scope of transactional immunity,
which forbade any future use of the compelled testimony. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
68. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 57, § 8.3(e), at 384.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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immunity does not extend beyond the witness receiving
immunity 71
The dual role of the grand jury presents some philosophical di-
chotomies. As a general proposition, coerced testimony has no
place in a criminal trial.72 The grand jury, as a shield, then should
prevent a case grounded entirely on such evidence from reaching
the courtroom.7 ' In its sword capacity, however, the grand jury has
the duty to probe further in order to discover whether enough
other evidence exists to warrant a trial. 4 Much of the remainder of
this Note will address this problem and offer some possible solu-
tions to this tangled logic.
Early History of the Grand Jury- The Framers' Intent in Rela-
tion to the Fifth Amendment
In Hale v. Henkel,75 the Supreme Court addressed the historic
underpinnings of the grand jury and its role in the criminal adjudi-
cation process. Hale, the secretary and treasurer of a company
under investigation, received a subpoena duces tecum commanding
him to appear before a grand jury to testify and to bring corporate
documents relating to the investigation.76 Hale appeared at the
designated time, but after stating his name and his position with
the firm, he refused to answer any other questions, despite the
prosecutor's assurance that he would receive immunity from pun-
ishment.77 Hale persisted in his refusal to testify, and ultimately
the presiding judge remanded him to the custody of the marshal
until he chose to answer questions and produce the demanded
papers.7 8
71. See infra notes 152-81 and accompanying text for discussion of various immunities.
72. See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956) ("The priv-
ilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be
taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of per-
jury. The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by
ambiguous circumstances.").
73. LAFAVE. & ISRAEL, supra note 57, § 8.1, at 376.
74. Id. § 8.1, at 376-77.
75. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
76. Id. at 44-46.
77. Id. at 46.
78. Id.
[Vol. 35:401412
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On appeal Hale argued that the circuit court had no power to
compel his testimony "No judicial matter was pending in the Cir-
cuit Court when appellant was required to attend before the grand
jury, or when the orders of May 5 and May 8 were made, in or
upon which he could be required to testify or produce evidence. '17
The appellant added that "[a]n ex parte investigation, based upon
mere suspicion, -without any complaint or charge, and that may be
without result, is not a 'case' or 'controversy' within the meaning of
the Constitution,""0 a requirement under Article III of the Consti-
tution without which a court has no power to act. 1 In addition,
Hale asserted that, as a matter of policy, possession by the grand
jury of an unlimited investigatory power would exceed the bounds
of the Constitution.8 2 "A grand jury does not possess, and cannot,
under the constitution of this State exercise, purely inquisitorial
power, because such power is in no sense a judicial one."'8 3
The United States argued, however, that "[t]he procedure of a
grand jury in this country at the time of the enactment of the Fifth
Amendment was, and, with unimportant exceptions, has remained
quite different from that of the similar body in England. '84 A
grand jury is supposed to investigate, not adjudicate, and has the
broadest possible inquisitorial power. 5 "Under this procedure the
grand jury proceeds, before a bill of indictment is framed, to inves-
tigate, at the instance of the court or of their own body or of the
district attorney, a suspected or alleged crime and to determine
whether it has been committed, and, if so, who committed it."8'6
In Hale, the Court ultimately ruled in favor of the United
States:
"[I]n this country it is for the grand jury to investigate any al-
leged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them, and
after determining that the evidence is sufficient to justify put-
79. Id. at 47.
80. Id.
81. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution [and] to Controversies." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
82. Hale, 201 U.S. at 49.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 51-52.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 52.
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ting the suspected party on trial, to direct the preparation of the
formal charge or indictment. '87
The Court underscored the breadth of power that the grand jury
held: "[T]he grand jury may proceed, either upon their own knowl-
edge or upon the examination of witnesses, to inquire for them-
selves whether a crime cognizable by the court has been
committed."' 8
The Court concluded that "[tihe interdiction of the Fifth
Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate
himself-in other words, to give testimony which may possibly ex-
pose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already
been taken away, the Amendment ceases to apply "89 Therefore, if
the defendant receives a grant of immunity in exchange for testi-
mony before the grand jury, no violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege exists.90
The Court, however, opened for discussion a broad swath of un-
charted territory, particularly with respect to whether the grand
jury hearing is a "proceeding" for purposes of immunity grants.9 1
While there may be some doubt whether the examination of wit-
nesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we have no
doubt that it is a "proceeding" The word should receive as
wide a construction as is necessary to protect the witness in his
disclosures, whenever such disclosures are made in pursuance of
a judicial inquiry The word "proceeding" is not a technical
one, and is aptly used by courts to designate an inquiry before a
grand jury 92
According to this definition of "proceeding," the promise that an
officer's statement made during an internal investigation will not
be used in a criminal proceeding should extend to the grand jury
hearing in order to protect the defendant's rights. In a time when
87. Id. at 63 (quoting Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895)).
88. Id. at 65.
89. Id. at 67; see also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (holding that the
grant of immunity must be absolute to replace the privilege against self-incrimination).
90. Hale, 201 U.S. at 67.
91. Id. at 66. But see id. at 67 ("If the testimony relate [sic] to criminal acts for
which he has already received a pardon or is guaranteed an immunity, the [Fifth]
[Almendment does not apply.").
92. Id.
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defendants' rights appear to be shrinking,9 3 however, the desire to
err on the side of preservation of the rights of a defendant wanes
as well.
Modern Interpretation of the Role of the Grand Jury in the
Criminal Process
In United States v. Calandra,94 the Court maintained that the
sources of an indictment do not affect its validity 95 Indeed, a de-
fendant may not challenge an indictment that is "valid on its
face," even if based on "information obtained in violation of a de-
fendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."9 6
In so stating, the Court recognized that the burden upon the indi-
vidual may be great, but the overwhelming interest of the grand
jury's right to "every man's evidence" outweighed these
considerations. 7
Short of a grand jury itself violating a privilege, 8 the Court indi-
cated that the grand jury rightfully enjoys freedom from interfer-
ence by the court.99 It drew a fine distinction between issuing an
indictment based purely on evidence obtained in violation of a
93. See, e.g., United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to prohibit
the prosecution of an immunized witness, even though the prosecution may have been influ-
enced by the immunized testimony, as long as the evidence at trial is denied from indepen-
dent sources), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989); United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the prosecution team's access to a defendant's prior immunized
testimony does not require automatically their withdrawal), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831
(1988).
94. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
95. Id. at 345.
96. Id. (citing Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349-50 (1958)). Neither is "an indict-
ment subject to a challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of
inadequate or incompetent evidence." Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
361-63 (1956) (holding that indictment based solely on hearsay is not in violation of the
Fifth Amendments Presentment Clause)). See infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text
for further discussion of the validity of indictments based upon faulty evidence.
97. Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 680, 682-88 (1972)). This concept of the
grand jury's right relates to its role as a representative of the public. Id.
98. The Court made no distinction between constitutional privileges and those created by
statute or the common law.
99. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346-47.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:401
privilege, a permissible exercise, and compelling a witness to testify
in violation of his constitutional rights.100
Refusing to extend the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amend-
ment, which prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment in a criminal proceeding against the victim
of the illegal search or seizure,' 0 ' to grand jury proceedings, the
Court envisioned the role of the grand jury not as a body that ad-
judicates guilt or innocence, but one free to "pursue its investiga-
tive and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and
procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial.' 0 2 Addition-
ally, the Court felt that the extension would deter conscientious
police investigation due to the fear that evidence obtained in good
faith could be excluded from the criminal process entirely 103 At
the same time, the refusal to extend the rule provided no perverse
incentive to seek evidence contrary to the search and seizure
clause. Any such impulse disappears in the face of its inadmissibil-
ity at trial. 104
The Court carved out another niche for the use of compelled tes-
timony at the grand jury level in United States v. Dionisio, °5 in
which the grand jury subpoenaed twenty people to give voice ex-
100. Id. "Although, for example, an indictment based on evidence obtained in violation of
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is nevertheless valid, the grand jury may not force
a witness to answer questions in violation of that constitutional guarantee." Id. at 346 (cita-
tion omitted). In fact, the trial court and not the grand jury, ultimately is responsible and
reigns supreme in that situation. The grand jury must turn to the court to request compul-
sion of a witness. Id. at 346 n.4.
101. Id. at 347.
102. Id. at 349.
103. Id. at 351.
104. Id. at 350-51. Foregoing the soundness of this reasoning for the moment, one could
employ such a policy rationale to support the exclusion of Garrity statements from the
grand jury altogether. Their admission would deter the ability of police departments to in-
terrogate their officers. One easily can imagine the reluctance an officer would have to testify
against his partner, even if the testifying officer were innocent, for fear that the government
would use the statement to indict his partner, thereby destroying the credibility of the testi-
fying officer in the eyes of his comrades.
Along the lines of the Court's reasoning, if the government can obtain an indictment
solely on illegally seized evidence, it may pin its hopes on the possibility of finding admissi-
ble evidence, either independently or from the illegal evidence itself, in the period between
seizing the evidence and trial.
105. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
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emplars for identification purposes. 106 Dionisio and others refused
to participate, claiming that the disclosure would violate their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.10 7 Because the voice exem-
plars were for identification rather than testimonial purposes, the
Court found no infringement of Fifth Amendment rights.10 8 The
Court differentiated the use of voice exemplars from the demand
that a witness testify against himself in violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, because requiring a person "to use his
voice as an identifying physical characteristic, [is] not to speak his
guilt.' 0 9
The Court again balanced the burden that grand jury subpoenas
create against their importance to the grand jury procedure, find-
ing the balance tipped far in favor of requiring attendance." 0
Pointing first to the historic obligation to appear and give evidence
before a grand jury,"' the Court emphasized that neither the ac-
tual nor the perceived burden of testifying was so great as to war-
rant an extension of the Fifth Amendment privilege.112 Indeed the
imposition of the subpoena was far less than the burden of an
arrest:
"The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the threat of it
and often in demeaning circumstances, and, in the case of arrest,
results in a record involving social stigma. A subpoena is served
in the same manner as other legal process; it involves no stigma
whatever and it remains at all times under the control and
supervision of a court. '" 113
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 5-7.
109. Id. at 7 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967)).
110. Id. at 10.
111. Id. at 9-10; see also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919) ("[T]he giving of
testimony and the attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public du-
ties. The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the indi-
vidual to the welfare of the public.").
112. Diontsw, 410 U.S. at 9-10.
113. Id. at 10 (quoting Judge Friendly in United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1973)). The stigma of a police officer receiving a subpoena
to appear before the court is perhaps far greater than the stigma Judge Friendly indicates
may attach in a normal case.
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At first glance the holding of Dionisto may appear to extend far-
ther than it actually does. The Court was careful to announce that
the production of a voice exemplar is not a testimonial act and
therefore its compulsion is not in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. 1 4 This holding served more as a preserver than as
a destroyer of the privilege against self-incrimination before the
grand jury I
The Nature of the Grand Jury and Unprotected Rights: United
States v Williams
The weight of authority supports the grand jury as an investiga-
tory body with broad subpoena and indictment power, rather than
an adjudicatory body that must follow standard rules of evidence
and procedure."' The Court addressed this issue in United States
v. Williams.117
In Williams, a federal grand jury indicted the respondent on
seven counts of" 'knowingly mak[ing] [a] false statement or report
for the purpose of influencing the action [of a federally
insured financial institution].' "118 The district court dismissed the
indictment without prejudice, finding that the government had
failed to present "substantial exculpatory evidence" to the grand
114. Id. at 7.
115. See infra notes 196-222 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), which held that only the production of testimonial statements
implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The implication of
these holdings is that a testimonial statement, including a Garrity statement, should receive
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
116. Each court that has addressed this issue quickly maintains that a grand jury may in
no way itself violate a privilege. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886)
(holding that a grand jury cannot compel a witness to produce books or papers that would
incriminate him). It must turn instead to the court for the legal power to do so. See United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974). Perhaps because the court exercises such
power through the grand jury, the court in some way extends its adjudicatory function to
the grand jury level. The grand jury itself is impotent to act in a judicial capacity even
though it has, as one of its roles, the ability to hand down an indictment. See United States
v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1744 (1992) (emphasizing that the grand jury has no power to
determine guilt or innocence but sits to assess whether enough evidence exists to bring a
criminal charge). Arguably any adjudicatory function at the grand jury level must be an
extension of the arm of the court.
117. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
118. Id. at 1737 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988)).
418
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jury, 9 and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court decision.120
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a district court may
not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment due to failure to present
"substantial exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury 121 The Court
found that, whereas federal courts of appeals may formulate proce-
dural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or by Con-
gress, the courts of appeals do not preside over the functioning of
the grand jury, an independent body 22
The power to control the procedure of the grand jury normally
does not attach, except in the rare case of misconduct before a
grand jury that "amounts to a violation of one of those 'few, clear
rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and
by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury's func-
tions.' ",123 From this premise, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court
in Williams, asserted that a rule requiring the government to dis-
close any substantial exculpatory evidence, as applied in this case,
exceeded the authority of the Tenth Circuit to make its own proce-
dural rules. 124
Basing the Court's decision upon "[t]he grand jury's functional
independence from the judicial branch both in the scope of its
power to investigate criminal wrongdoing, and in the manner in
which that power is exercised,' 1 25 Justice Scalia compared the re-
spective domains of the grand jury and the court. 26 He conceded
119. Id. at 1737.
120. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1735
(1992).
121. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746.
122. Id. at 1741 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)).
123. Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)). Importantly, Congress set forth one of those rules in 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (documenting
the procedures for granting a witness immunity from prosecution when that witness refuses
to testify based on an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege). Id. at 1741 n.6. See
infra notes 152-81 and accompanying text for further discussion of the use immunity.
124. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742. Note in particular that the Court, after proposing that
the grand jury and the court were absolutely separate, held that this dichotomy should ap-
ply only as a rule-of-thumb.
125. Id., see, e.g., United States v. R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991) (holding in part
that the subpoenas issued by a grand jury emanate from a broader ability to compel the
production of evidence than those coming from a court).
126. Id. at 1742-43. Justice Scalia reminded the reader that a court's jurisdiction depends
on the existence of a case or controversy, whereas a grand jury can investigate on suspicion
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that the provinces of grand jury and court overlapped,12 and that
the court would refuse to lend its assistance to the grand jury when
it seeks to compel testimony in a fashion that would override
rights accorded by the Constitution or common law privileges. 128
Several significant constitutional rights, however, would not be
protected in a grand jury proceeding under Justice Scalia's test.'29
Most notably, he points to decisions holding that a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment' is not a bar to
indictment when a previous grand jury would not hand one
down, 1 ' and to the "twice suggested"'3 2 position that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach when a grand jury
summons an individual to appear.13 3 The Court added rather tri-
that a law is being violated, or "even because it wants assurance that it is not." Id. (citing
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)).
127. Id. The grand jury cannot compel the attendance of witnesses or force production of
evidence, and so must turn to the court when such a compulsion is required.
128. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743. For example, in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972), upon which Justice Scalia relied for this assertion, the Court limited a grand jury
subpoena to preserve the immunity accorded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Specifically,
Gravel held that an injunction against interrogating a Senator's aide with respect to any act
he performed within the scope of his employment was too broad. However, "[t]he grand
jury[,] if relevant to its investigation into the possible violations of the criminal law,
and absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from [the Senator's aide] answers to
questions relating to his or the Senator's arrangements " Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
This decision indicates that Fifth Amendment privileges ought to govern the actions of
the grand jury as well as the court itself, regardless of any division between the two. Courts
also have protected the marital communications privilege from the power of the grand jury
subpoena. See In re Hugle, 754 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1985).
129. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743 ("No doubt in view of the grand jury proceeding's status
as other than a constituent element of a 'criminal prosecution,' we have said that certain
constitutional protections afforded defendants in criminal proceedings have no application
before that body.") (citations omitted).
130. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides the following: "[N]or shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V
The primary purpose of this clause is to bar the retrial of a criminal case, not for the pur-
pose of judicial economy, but for the protection of the defendant from oppressive prosecu-
tion. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 57, § 25, at 1055.
131. See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250-251 (1932) (holding that the
duty of a grand jury to return an indictment is not limited by actions taken by a previously
convened grand jury); United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 413-15 (1920) (reasoning
that the fact that a grand jury has investigatory power necessitates a theory that a second
grand jury may review and alter findings of the prior grand jury).
132. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743.
133. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion) (af-
firming by reference to "settled principles" that a witness possibly involved in criminal ac-
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umphantly that, "[i]n view of the grand jury proceeding's status as
other than a constituent element of a 'criminal prosecutio[n],' we
have said that certain constitutional protections afforded defend-
ants in criminal proceedings have no application before that
body M34
Thus, the grand jury's independence from the adjudicatory na-
ture of the court means, for the most part, that it may use wrong-
fully obtained evidence but may not itself procure it. Neither con-
cerns for the use of illegally obtained testimony nor its perceived
unreliability shall keep it from the grand jury once it is ob-
tained. 135 The bar to the subsequent use of a Garrity statement in
a criminal proceeding, therefore, does not appear to prevent the
grand jury from gaining access to such a statement. Regardless of
whether the grand jury is in fact an arm of the criminal proceed-
ing, the Court clearly enunciated the threshold test for admissibil-
ity of evidence obtained in contradiction of a constitutional right
or a privilege.1 36
tivity has no right to counsel before a grand jury, but maintaining that the witness has an
absolute duty to answer the questions of the grand jury subject to a valid Fifth Amendment
claim); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (holding that during the fire marshall's inves-
tigation of a fire that occurred on the appellant's property, the appellant did not have a
right to counsel, in part due to case law holding no right to counsel before grand juries).
The Williams Court also cited Calandra with approval: "[O]ur cases suggest that an in-
dictment obtained through the use of evidence previously obtained in violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination 'is nevertheless valid.'" Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974)); cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 736 (1980) (holding that the court's supervisory power may not allow a potential de-
fendant to invoke the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party). See also infra notes 198-
222 and accompanying text (discussing the invocation of the Fifth Amendment rights of a
third party).
134. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743 (citation omitted). The Court rejected respondent's ar-
gument that the lower court ruling requiring the presentation of substantial exculpatory
evidence amounted to an application of Fifth Amendment "common law" providing for the
quality of evidence heard by the grand jury. Id. at 1744.
135. Id. at 1745-46. " '[T]he mere fact that evidence itself is unreliable is not sufficient to
require a dismissal of the indictment, [nor will] a challenge to the reliability or compe-
tence of the evidence presented to the grand jury [be heard].'" Id. at 1746 (quoting Bank of
Nova Scotia v. Upited States, 487 U.S. 250, 261 (1988)).
136. In response to the Court's position, perhaps the proper question to ask is at what
point does the violation of the Fifth Amendment occur in the case of the Garrity statement?
Accepting the premise that a basic and indispensable requirement of a violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the presentment of the evidence to a
body other than the internal affairs division, and that the Court in Garrity and Gardner was
correct in permitting the coercion of such statements so long as the statements are not used
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Justice Stevens, writing in dissent and joined by Justices. Black-
mun, O'Connor and Thomas, outlined an entirely different ap-
proach to the categorization of the grand jury's role. Rather than
the investigatory-adjudicatory dialectic that the majority con-
structs, the dissent proceeded from the premise that courts ought
to be able to exercise some measure of authority over the grand
jury proceeding."' 7 Misconduct, here in the form of the failure of
the U.S. Attorney to present exculpatory evidence, is not foreign to
the grand jury,'38 but in the eyes of the dissenting Justices, it is
impermissible. lse
The dissent echoes Justice Sutherland's condemnation of such
intolerable behavior in Berger v. United States. 40
"The United States Attorney is the representative not of an or-
dinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obliga-
tion to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prose-
cution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one. "141
The dissent posits that the prosecutor equally holds a duty to re-
frain from using improper methods of obtaining an indictment. 142
This responsibility takes on special significance in a grand jury
in a subsequent criminal proceeding, it may be argued that when a grand jury forces a
witness to present testimony, with or without the assistance of the court, the grand jury is in
fact the first violator of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
137. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1752-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1749. Prosecutors have presented perjured testimony. E.g., United States v.
Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1974). They have failed to inform the grand jury of its
authority to subpoena witnesses. United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir.
1979). They also have misstated the law. United States v. Roberts, 481 F Supp. 1385, 1389
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
139. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1749-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
141. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at
88).
142. Id. Part of Justice Stevens' concern is that grand juries cannot perform their func-
tion as the protectors of the innocent from malicious and random prosecution if they may
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proceeding during which a prosecutor proceeds unchecked by
judge or opposing counsel. "'For while in theory a trial provides
the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the
charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment
will often have a devastating personal and professional impact that
a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo.' ,1"43 The dissent in
Williams recognized the impact, avoidable by imposing controls on
the grand jury proceeding, that the stigma of an indictment may
have upon a person,'44 an effect that the Court quickly dismissed
in Calandra and Dionisw. 145
To avoid this result, the dissent rejected the relatively stringent
separation between court and grand jury in favor of a grand jury at
the service of the court.146 On this count, the dissent emphasized a
point that the majority discounted:
"A grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas,
but it remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform
its investigative function without the court's aid, because power-
less itself to compel the testimony of witnesses. It is the court's
process which summons the witness to attend and give testi-
mony, and it is the court which must compel a witness to testify
if, after appearing, he refuses to do so.'147
be misled by prosecutors "on whose knowledge of the law and facts of the underlying crimi-
nal investigation the jurors will, of necessity, rely." Id. at 1753.
143. Id. at 1750 (quoting United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979)).
144. Id.
145. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1974); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973); see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing this
stigma).
146. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1751-53. "Although the grand jury has not been "textually
assigned' to 'any of the branches described in the first three Articles' of the Constitution, it
is not an autonomous body completely beyond the reach of the other branches. '[A]
grand jury is neither an officer nor an agent of the United States, but a part of the court.'"
Id. at 1752 (citation omitted) (quoting Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742; Falter v. United States,
23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590 (1928)).
147. Id. at 1752 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49
(1959)). The majority recognized the power of the Court to "invoke its supervisory authority
to fashion and enforce privilege rules applicable in grand jury proceedings and suggest[ed]
that it may also invoke its supervisory authority to fashion other limited rules of grand jury
procedure." Id. at 1753 (citation to majority opinion omitted). The dissent felt that the
Court could equally fashion rules regarding standards of prosecutorial conduct without com-
promising the historical role of the grand jury as an independent, inquisitorial institution.
Id. at 1753. A court could also employ such a power to create a "new" privilege in certain
evidence by extending protection to the statements taken in accord with Garrity.
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In fact, the investigatory traits to which the majority pointed have
often been held to be adjudicatory in nature: " 'the inquisitorial
function of the grand jury and the compulsion of witnesses were
recognized as incidents of the judicial power of the United
States.' "148
The dilemma left unresolved after Williams is precisely what the
role of the grand jury may be in violating the Fifth Amendment
privilege. As is clear from the decision, the grand jury may have
access to statements protected by the Fifth Amendment only when
the grand jury itself is not the culprit.149 The court steps in on
behalf of and at the behest of the grand jury to produce the de-
manded testimony 150 Although an indictment based on testimony
coerced from a witness is valid as long as the grand jury did none
of the coercing, no law should permit a court to coerce a statement
for the benefit of the grand jury's curiosity in precisely the same
way that the grand jury is prohibited from doing. Perhaps a more
satisfactory answer, where the court -preserves the privilege while
obtaining the information for the grand jury, lies in the use of im-
munity as provided for by 18 U.S.C. § 6002.151
USE OF COMPELLED TESTIMONY: IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
Federal Creation of Use and Derwatwe Use Immunities
In order to overcome the potentially chilling effect of the Fifth
Amendment privilege-the silence of a vital witness-while pre-
serving the constitutional rights of the holder of the privilege, Con-
gress enacted a statute that provides:
148. Id. at 1752 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919)); see also Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. at 346 & n.4. The operations of the grand jury are unrestrained "because
Congress and the Court have generally thought it best not to impose procedural restraints
on the grand jury; it is not because they lack all power to do so." Williams, 112 S. Ct. at
1752.
149. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743.
150. The Court has not addressed directly whether the imposition of the trial court's
power results in a Fifth Amendment violation. After Williams, it is relatively clear that the
grand jury does not violate the Fifth Amendment by asking the trial court to intercede.
151. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1988) (creating a federal statutory use and derivative use
immunity). See also infra notes 152-81 and accompanying text.
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Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrinmation, to testify or provide other informa-
tion in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two
Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and
the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not re-
fuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other informa-
tion compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.152
Because a grand jury cannot force testimony despite its ability to
subpoena a witness or records, the grand jury is for practical pur-
poses powerless to compel testimony that would violate the Fifth
Amendment. A federal statute permits the court, at the request of
the grand jury, to issue an order requiring the witness to testify 153
If the witness fails to do so, she will be held in contempt of the
court order and jailed until such time as she decides to testify 154
The witness, however, is not left unprotected. The court issuing
the order also grants the witness an immunity that is coextensive
with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
called a "use immunity ,,15" In effect, this type of immunity man-
dates that the prosecution make no use of the compelled testimony
against the witness.1 58 Application of this rule can be difficult. For
example, the issue arises whether the prosecutor violates the de-
152. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). Sections 6001-6005 were enacted and became effective in
1970.
153. Id. § 6003.
154. Id. §§ 6001-6005.
155. Id. § 6002. Such immunity accommodates the government's interest in obtaining
otherwise unavailable evidence, but simultaneously protects the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1972). The principle involved
is called the doctrine of coextensiveness. Id. at 449. The statute forces testimony, but con-
fers upon the witness protection at least tantamount to the protection that the Fifth
Amendment provides, technically resulting in no violation of the privilege. Id.
156. Id.
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fendant's immunity if he learns discreet, incriminating facts about
either the defendant or another party purely from the immunized
testimony 157
Under several common law decisions, the prosecutor could over-
ride the Fifth Amendment privilege of a witness, but only by a
grant of transactional immunity 158 This variety of immunity was
much more extensive in its limitation on the use of the compelled
testimony 159 Transactional immunity was in effect complete. Sec-
tion 6002 narrowed the scope of this immunity by prohibiting use
and derivative use of the testimony, thereby removing immunity as
a complete defense to prosecution.'60 This statute followed the Su-
preme Court's trend of narrowing the extent of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.' 6' Ultimately, in enacting the statute, Congress re-
stricted the proscription of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to use immunity and derivative use immunity 162
Theoretically, derivative use immunity prevents the government,
after hearing the compelled testimony protected by the use immu-
nity, from using that testimony to seek out other information that
would incriminate the defendant or other parties. 1 3
157. Concerns surrounding just such a case have given rise to the "derivative use" immu-
nity, discussed infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
158. Transactional immunity protects a witness compelled to testify from prosecution for
any crimes related to information disclosed in the course of his testimony. See, e.g., Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892) ("[L]egislation cannot abridge a constitu-
tional privilege, and it cannot replace or supply one, at least unless [the new privilege]
is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect.").
159. Compare id. with New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (holding that the im-
peachment of any testimony at trial is among the uses the government may not make of
immunized testimony).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966) (holding that a defendant may
suppress no more than incriminating evidence which the government acquires in violation of
the Fifth Amendment, and the fruits thereof); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964) (finding that the application of a state immunity statute does not preclude the fed-
eral prosecution of the witness).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). The idea was to limit the protection, which was perceived to
exceed the Fifth Amendment under the older case law and statutes, to no more than the
scope of the Fifth Amendment. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1970), re-
prtnted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4008.
163. Although the use/derivative use immunity structure gives government prosecutors
much more leeway in conducting their investigations than transactional immunity, they also
face the difficult decision whether to put a witness on the stand whom they know will invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege. The government will want to know the extent of the testi-
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The immunity that protects the defendant is therefore no longer
a complete one. This incompleteness presents the trial court with a
difficult decision: exactly how much protection will the testimony
receive? The derivative use immunity creates this gray area. From
the letter of the statute, the court clearly cannot permit use of the
testimony itself, neither the words spoken nor the documents pro-
duced.164 The Supreme Court also has held that the government
cannot use the compelled testimony to impeach any testimony at
trial1 5 or to develop other evidence.1 6 Despite Professor Humble's
convincing argument supporting the use of compelled testimony
for nonevidentiary purposes,16 7 courts are split on the question of
mony before the witness testifies because the immunity statute prohibits evidentiary use of
compelled testimony even if it is not incriminating. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). The govern-
ment also will have the burden of showing that other testimony is not a result of a deriva-
tive use of the protected testimony. See generally Warren D. Wolfson, Immunity-How It
Works in Real Life, 67 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 179-80 (1976) (concerning the appli-
cation of the use of voluntary and involuntary immunity). The statute effectively gives the
government a choice. The government can seek an order from the district court compelling
the witness to testify, in which case the government will have to show later at trial that it
did not use the testimony against the witness at trial, or, the government may elect to leave
the testimony of the witness behind in favor of seeking other routes of proof to avoid this
pitfall. Gary S. Humble, Nonevwdentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth
Amendment, 66 Tax L. REv. 351, 352 (1987).
Professor Humble argues persuasively that to follow the spirit and letter of 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002, protection extends only to evidentiary uses of the compelled testimony. Id. He
states that:
[t]he nonevidentiary use of a defendant's compelled testimony does not
threaten these policies underlying the fifth amendment. The federal immunity
statute requires the government to develop its evidence without the aid of the
defendant's compelled testimony and to prove that all its evidence has been
independently obtained. The reliability of a defendant's compelled testimony
is not a concern when the government obtains all its evidence independently
and not derivatively.
Id. at 372.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
165. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979).
166. See Counselman v. Hitehcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892) (holding unconstitutional a
state inmunity statute that would have allowed the use of a witness' compelled testimony to
discover other evidence against the witness in violation of the witness' Fifth Amendment
rights). Professor Humble gives the following example: if a witness testifies under compul-
sion of an order to the existence of a previously unknown coconspirator, the government
cannot seek out that individual to testify against the defendant. Humble, supra note 163, at
353.
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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whether the use immunity statute forbids only evidentiary uses or
extends to other uses as well.168
The court in United States v. McDaniel'69 opted to disallow any
use of the compelled testimony The defendant had received im-
munity and testified before a grand jury 170 Before the trial, an as-
sistant U.S. attorney read the transcript of McDaniels' testimony
before the grand jury that contained his admissions to various
crimes. 17  The trial court determined in an evidentiary hearing
that the government had established independent and legitimate
sources for its evidence.172 On appeal, the court found that the gov-
ernment's burden was "virtually undischargeable' a7 because the
prosecution would have to show that the evidence read before trial
was not used in any fashion to aid the preparation for trial. 7 4 The
court held that for immunity to be coextensive with the Fifth
Amendment, "it must forbid all prosecutorial use of the testimony,
not merely that which results in the presentation of evidence
before the jury ,175
168. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that com-
pelled testimony cannot be used for any purpose); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524
(11th Cir. 1985) (allowing for some use of compelled testimony). See also Jerome A. Mur-
phy, Comment, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain Status of Deriva-
tive Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REV. 1011 (1992) (discussing recent, high-profile cases that
demonstrate the inconsistent standards applied by lower courts with regard to permissible
derivative use of immunized testimony). The hope, of course, is that after application of the
use immunity statute, the government will be no better off and the witness/defendant will
be no worse off strategically than before the court compelled the testimony. To assure this
end, Professor Strachan suggests several evidentiary uses that are impermissible yet benefi-
cial to the government: use in the decision whether to prosecute or plea bargain; aid in
preparation for trial, including the development of questions and trial strategy; use to moti-
vate the search for independent sources of information (similar to a garden-variety deriva-
tive use); and use as a psychological threat of a perjury prosecution if trial testimony differs
from immunized testimony. Kristine Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Water-
gate, 56 TEx. L. REV. 791, 807-09 (1978).
169. 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
170. Id. at 307.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 309.
173. Id. at 312.
174. Id. at 310-11.
175. Id. at 311 (emphasis added). Other circuits have cited McDaniel with approval. See,
e.g., United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 723 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Barker, 542
F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1976).
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On the other hand, some circuits have agreed with Professor
Humble, holding that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit non-
evidentiary uses of compelled testimony 116 These cases are pre-
mised mainly on the belief that it would be nearly impossible for
the government to "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the immunized testimony did not directly enter into a
subsequent decision to prosecute. 177 As a result, to rule that sec-
tion 6002 immunizes compelled testimony against all uses, includ-
ing nonevidentiary ones, is tantamount to giving the defendant
transactional immunity and runs contrary to the intent of Con-
gress when it adopted section 6002 with the purpose of eliminating
transactional immunity completely 178
To inject an analysis of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination into this quagmire of interpretation would only
serve to obscure the issues further.179 Instead, in an effort to better
preserve the Fifth Amendment rights of police officers subjected to
coercion, the Court or Congress could permit use immunity to de-
velop upon performance of the coercive act by the government.
Such an extension of the doctrine of use and derivative use immu-
nity is not complicated conceptually Accepting as a necessary pre-
mise that the taking of a Garnty statement involves real coer-
cion,180 this coercion is no different than the order of the court
176. E.g., United States v. Mariam, 851 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1011 (1989); United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
831 (1988). United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).
177. Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1531.
178. H.R, REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N.
4007, 4017-18. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
179. This Note has not ventured to address the full range of issues that muddy this area.
One other issue worth brief mention is the possible application of the reasoning in State v.
Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964), to the internal affairs divisions of police departments.
Oiwell held- that an attorney may be required to come forward with evidence that incrimi-
nates her client. Id. at 684. A court could extend this theory to justify the enforcement of a
subpoena of Garrity statements that would tend to incriminate an officer. For further anal-
ogy of attorney-client relations and internal affairs-officer interaction, see infra notes 182-95
and accompanying text.
180. Of course, Justice Harlan would have taken issue with this premise. Harlan, dissent-
ing in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), argued that no coercion existed, either as
a matter of fact or as a matter of law. In fact, the threat of dismissal from office was a
permissible condition imposed by the State in order to obtain information from its employ-
ees. Id. at 506-07.
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forcing testimony 181 The incentive to give protection coextensive
with the Fifth Amendment privilege is perhaps greater in the case
of the police department coercing testimony because then it is
state action that results in the deprivation of a fundamental right.
Such an interpretation of use immunity would streamline the pro-
cess, informing both the government and the witness before a
grand jury investigation ever commenced.
Garrity Statements as Privilege
Even if no right is violated until the injection of court action, 182
by the very nature of the relationship between the officer and the
department, some sort of special relationship exists. The promise
to prevent use of the statement at a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing adds to the perception of required heightened protection. Rein-
forced and legitimized by the decisions in Garrity and Gardner,
the guarantee amounts to a type of privilege that the court could
decide not to disturb and thus deny admission of such evidence.
The Court, in fact, may have thought the same thing. On the
same day that it decided Garrity v. New Jersey, it also ruled on
Spevack v. Klein.183 Spevack, a member of the New York Bar,
faced disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct, includ-
ing the refusal to honor a subpoena duces tecum served upon
him. 8 4 He raised as his only defense the fact that compliance
would tend to incriminate him.8 5 Explicitly overturning Cohen v.
181. Courts should be reluctant to begin categorizing coercions as more or less violative of
the Fifth Amendment. If the inquisition of a police officer pursuant to an internal investiga-
tion gives rise to a compelled statement contrary to the privilege against self-incrimination,
the court should recognize it as such. Violations of the Fifth Amendment should not come in
different sizes and flavors.
182. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the timing of the con-
stitutional violation.
183. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
184. Id. at 512-13.
185. Id.
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Hurley,Is6 the Court held that lawyers are not relegated to a
"watered-down" version of constitutional rights. s7
In so holding, the Court in Spevack emphasized that the threat
of disbarment was a coercive force equal in strength to that de-
scribed in Garrity 188 The Court expressed moral disdain for the
use of threats to coerce statements.8 9 It approached the question
of the privilege to be free from self-incrimination from an angle
almost opposite that of the Court in United States v. Williams.'9"
Underlying the Court's attitude was the idea that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is truly a privilege.' 91 The relationship cre-
ated between lawyer and state bar association lays the foundation
for the imposition of a "sanction which makes assertion of the
Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly' 192 In fact, the Court's deci-
sion in Spevack makes clear, as it did in its twin Garrity,1'9 that
even though a police officer is an employee of the state with com-
mensurate duties, the prosecution may not use testimony given
under fear of dismissal in a criminal proceeding. 94
186. 366 U.S. 117 (1961) (ruling that to disbar an attorney solely based on the invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
187. Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514. This holding uses almost the same language as that in
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967): "We conclude that policemen, like teachers and
lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Id. at 500.
188. Id. at 515-17.
189. The Court cited Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886):
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitu-
tional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed."
Spevack, 385 U.S. at 515 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635).
190. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992). For a discussion of Williams, see supra notes 116-51 and
accompanying text.
191. The Court invoked the then-recent memory of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), for the proposition that it should construe liberally the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516.
192. Spevack, 385 U.S. at 515 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
193. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
194. See Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514 (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends
to all individuals and shall not be weakened by the cost of losing one's livelihood). Justice
Fortas, concurring in the result, felt that a lawyer's right to remain silent should be distin-
guished from that of a police officer's, an employee of the state: "The special responsibilities
that he [the lawyer] assumes as licensee of the State and officer of the court do not carry
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The question remains whether the government created a use im-
munity in the testimony of the police officer the moment that it
coerced the statement. The intent of the department not to use the
statements against the officer is clear, but if the coercive power of
the internal affairs division is as strong as that of the court, then
the court should extend a use immunity to the statements as an
alternative to excluding them altogether. 95 This solution would
serve the dual purpose of promoting justice and preserving the
rights of the individual.
The Grant of a "Projected Privilege" to the Statements of Law
Enforcement Officers
United States v Fisher and Whether a Police Department Has
Standing to Assert the Fifth Amendment Privilege of the
Officer
To gain access to Garrity statements, a grand jury often will
subpoena the internal affairs division for an officer's file. The rea-
son for directing the subpoena to the department is clear: the in-
ternal affairs division holds the written report of the investigating
officer. A grand jury will presume that the record of the officer's
statements is more accurate than his live testimony This pre-
sumption is valid for two reasons. First, the report was made
shortly after the interview and thus is not tainted and obscured by
time or the opportunity for the officer to reflect on his responses. 19
Second, if the grand jury obtains the file without argument, it will
not need a court order compelling the officer to testify in exchange
for a grant of immunity, thus saving time and not limiting the gov-
ernment's ability to use the contents of the file against the
officer. 97
with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth Amendment rights." Id. at 520 (For-
tas, J., concurring).
195. New Jersey, in the wake of the Garrity decision, enacted a statute extending this
variety of protection to public officers. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.2a2 (1988) (enacted in
1970).
196. The possibility that the investigating officer taped the conversation further enhances
the reliability of the record.
197. For discussion on the immunity grant generally, see supra notes 152-81 and accom-
panying text.
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A grand jury has an additional reason to issue a subpoena to the
internal affairs division, one that is trickier and places another
roadblock m the path of an officer's Fifth Amendment privilege.
Upon receiving the subpoena, the internal affairs division typically
will file a motion to quash it. The division will assert that comply-
ing with the subpoena would violate the officer's Fifth Amendment
privilege. When defending against this motion, the prosecutor can
argue persuasively that the department lacks standing to assert the
officer's privilege against self-incrimination.198 Because neither the
grand jury nor the court has compelled the officer to do anything
in this hypothetical situation, the court can rule that the officer's
Fifth Amendment privilege was not implicated.' 99
The Court followed this line of analysis in a case in which an
attorney refused to comply with a summons from the Internal Rev-
enue Service demanding tax records of his client. 00 In Fisher v.
United States, two taxpayers had transferred to their respective
attorneys documents related to the preparation of their tax re-
turns.20 1 The Internal Revenue Service, upon discovering the
whereabouts of the documents, served each of the attorneys with
subpoenas for the records.20 2 The attorneys refused to comply 203
After the Court ruled that the subpoenas directed at the attor-
neys did not implicate the taxpayers' Fifth Amendment privi-
leges, 20 4 the Court raised sua sponte the question of whether the
attorney-client privilege protects documents that would have been
shielded from a summons had the documents remained in the cli-
ent's hands.20 5 The Court immediately answered affirmatively-
"Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order
198. The Supreme Court announced, as a general rule, that the Fifth Amendment pro-
vides only a personal privilege that third parties cannot raise. Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
199. The Supreme Court so held when an attorney attempted to assert his client's Fifth
Amendment privilege to justify his resistance to an Internal Revenue Service summons for
documents related to his client's taxes. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1976).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 394.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 395.
204. Id. at 396.
205. Id. at 402.
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to obtain legal assistance are privileged."20 The purpose of this
privilege is "to encourage clients to make full disclosures to their
attorneys. "207 Practically speaking, if a client believed that infor-
mation in the hands of his attorney was vulnerable to a summons
despite its safety in his own hands, then the client would be highly
reluctant to confide in his attorney 208 The Court feared that such
an incentive would lead to misinformed or uninformed counsel, re-
sulting in inadequate protection of criminal defendants.20
To avoid this unwanted result, the Court ruled that when a cli-
ent transfers documents to an attorney for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice, the privilege not to comply with a summons or
a subpoena extends to the lawyer.2 10 To claim the privilege, the
attorney must make two showings: that the attorney-client privi-
lege exists, and that the client, if subpoenaed, would be able to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. s1 In Fisher, the Court eas-
ily found that the transfer was incident to the client's receipt of
legal advice and thus implicated the attorney-client privilege.1 2
The second prong of the test, whether the client could invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege, proved a more intricate inquiry
In order to decide if the documents while in the client's hands
would be protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court
focused not on the content of the documents, but on the act of
producing them.21 '3 From the record, the Court first found that the
preparation of the documents was not compelled testimony 214 The
206. Id. at 403 (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (John T. McNaughton rev.
ed., 1961)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 404-05.
210. Id.
211. In other words, the attorney must demonstrate first, that the subpoenaed documents
are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and second, that forcing the client to produce
documents would violate the client's privilege against self-incrimination. The former deter-
mination will depend largely on how the attorney obtained the evidence from his client,
such as whether the transfer was part of an attempt to obtain legal advice. See id.
212. Id. at 405.
213. See id. at 409-13. Prior to Fisher, the availability of the privilege turned on the
contents of the document, not on the act of producing them. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that the compelled production of an invoice for goods allegedly
imported by the defendants violated the Fifth and Fourth Amendments because the com-
pelled production was equivalent to forcing the witnesses to testify against themselves).
214. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10.
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Court reasoned that the creation of the documents was "wholly
voluntary," and that "[t]he taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with
the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence
contains incriminating writing.12 15 The Court stated that merely
writing the document in question did not create a Fifth Amend-
ment violation.216 Once written, the Court asked whether the mere
act of producing the documents violated the Fifth Amendment.
The Court conceded that the act of producing the documents may
have a communicative aspect which could be a testimonial event.21 7
In this case, however, giving the papers over to the IRS only
showed their existence and location and did not rise to the level of
testimony" In holding that a summons directed at the taxpayers
would not have violated their Fifth Amendment privilege, the
Court apparently differentiated between a testimonial event, either
spoken or written, which itself was compelled, and a document
that may contain incriminating facts but the preparation of which
is not compelled. 9
Important m the case of a Garrity statement, the Court carves
out an exception to the general rule that written documents are
not necessarily testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment.220 When an internal affairs officer takes a Garnty statement,
a government agent has in fact compelled the creation of the docu-
ment. This fact alone would seem to satisfy the Fisher Court's re-
quirement that the act of producing the document must be testi-
monial in order to find a violation of the officer's Fifth Amendment
privilege. Moreover, the police department could argue that but for
the coercion of the department the document would not exist, and
215. Id. The Court then tempered its aggressive venture into previously uncharted wa-
ters. It acknowledged that in some limited cases, acts of producing evidence are in them-
selves communicative, and if so categorized would be in violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Id. at 410.
216. Id. at 410-411. The Court gives the compulsion of handwriting exemplars as an ex-
ample of potentially incriminating evidence that, though compelled, would not violate the
Fifth Amendment because they are not testimonial in nature. Id. at 411.
217. Id. at 410.
218. Id. at 411.
219. Id. at 409-11.
220. Id. at 410 n.11. The Court asserted that, "unless the Government has compelled the
subpoenaed person to write the document," the fact that a document was written should not
control the inquiry into a Fifth Amendment violation. Id.
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therefore the act of production would necessarily violate the privi-
lege of the officer.2 21
The hypertechnical and murky distinctions the Court in Fisher
drew between testimonial and nontestimonial acts of production
have created uncertain results.222 At a minimum, the law should
not permit the government to circumvent an officer's privilege
against self-incrimination by successfully subpoenaing a file that
contains statements coerced by a different segment of the same
government. This undesirable state of affairs requires a more uni-
fied, prospective approach in order to protect the interests of both
officers who undergo the coercive effects of the internal affairs divi-
sion and the police departments that need to carry out internal
investigations in order to maintain their integrity
The Preservation of Fifth Amendment Rights Through a "Pro-
jected Privilege"
An interesting solution to the immunity dilemma is the "pro-
jected privilege" suggested by Professor Reitz.22 3 Because of the in-
equities between the "theoretical legal abilities of an unrepre-
sented suspect to conduct a defense consistent with constitutional
guarantees, on the one hand, and the comparable abilities of a sus-
pect represented by counsel on the other .[,] a suspect's rights
should not change when a lawyer enters the case." '224
221. A successful attempt to block access to the subpoenaed file would not entirely defeat
the government's ability to obtain the evidence under current federal law. The government
could grant statutory use immunity to the witness under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The
immunity grant forces compliance with the subpoena, but guarantees that the government
will make no direct or derivative use of the incriminating testimony. The government, how-
ever, may still lose on another level. The form of the evidence, live testimony as opposed to
written records, may not help the government's case as much as would the internal affairs
file with its detail and proximity to the events in question.
222. Subsequent decisions of the Court have not helped to clarify matters. See, e.g., Doe
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1990) (holding a court order compelling defendant to sign
consent form for release of subpoenaed documents not testimonial and thus not protected
by the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (holding that the act of
producing subpoenaed documents is testimonial and thus protected by the Fifth
Amendment).
223. Reitz, supra note 20. Professor Reitz' proposed projected privilege would protect
communications between criminal defense attorneys and their clients. Id. at 575-76.
224. Id. at 650.
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Professor Reitz' concern arose from a string of cases that im-
posed a duty upon defense counsel to come forward with any "rele-
vant, client-incriminating" information. 25 In addition, the govern-
ment increasingly has begun using grand jury subpoenas directed
at defense counsel to unearth evidence intended to incriminate the
defendant.226 The latter case implicates the same concerns that
this Note has raised, in particular, whether such a subpoena cir-
cumvents the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
The solution Professor Reitz suggests is the "projected privi-
lege, 227 defined as follows:
A lawyer should be permitted to assert her client's privilege
against self-incrimination with respect to all evidence and infor-
mation that might implicate the client in past crimes when such
evidence and information was lawfully acquired by the lawyer in
the scope of the representation.2
The projected privilege seeks to preserve the status quo as defined
by the Fifth Amendment rights that a client has before seeking
counsel. The privilege would extend to the lawyer the ability to
resist disclosure of evidence whenever the client would be able to
assert that right.229 As such, the client's Fifth Amendment privi-
lege would be projected onto the attorney 230
Importantly, the projected privilege is not intended to permit
the attorney to assist the client in the commission of a new wrong,
nor is it designed to create new obstacles to the investigation of
crime.2 31 Essentially, evidence in the hands of a lawyer is to be no
225. Id. at 573 (citing State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964) (holding that a defense
attorney has a duty to produce physical evidence of a violent crime)).
226. Reitz, supra note 20, at 574.
227. Id. at 575.
228. Id. at 651. Professor Reitz bases this theory on United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391
(1976). Fisher created what Reitz calls a "simulated Fifth Amendment privilege" that ex-
tends to evidence that an attorney receives in connection with a communication protected
by the attorney-client privilege. Reitz, supra note 20, at 651 n.343. His projected privilege
expands on this idea, reaching all evidence acquired during representation of the client, as
long as the evidence is obtained lawfully. Id.
229. Id. at 651-52.
230. Id. at 652.
231. Id. at 653-54.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
more and no less accessible to the government than it would be if
it were in the hands of the client alone.2 2
This proposed system lends an interesting possible application
to the Garnty statement situation. In a fashion very similar to the
attorney-client relationship, the internal affairs department is the
caretaker of the document that results from the coerced testimony,
i.e., the report.23 The department has a great practical incentive to
assert the officer's Fifth Amendment rights, namely, the need for
the ongoing cooperation of officers in internal investigations and
good will in the department. Conveniently, the court has sanc-
tioned this sort of relationship in both Garrity and Gardner,2
making its application that much more feasible.
The style of Professor Reitz' delineation of the projected privi-
lege as applied to a Garrity statement can be mimicked as follows:
An internal affairs division should be permitted to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination held by its officers with re-
spect to all evidence and information that might implicate an
officer in past crimes when such evidence and information was
lawfully acquired (according to the dictates of Garrity) by the
internal affairs division in the scope of the questioning of the
officer.
In no way does such a privilege extend the rights that an officer
has against self-incrimination. It merely assures that despite the
coercive techniques used to obtain information, the system will
leave the officer in no worse a position constitutionally than if she
had never been the subject of the interview. 23 5 The purpose of the
232. Id. at 654.
233. This comparison makes the parallel between Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967),
and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), so interesting and fortuitous.
234. See supra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
235. For instance, if a grand jury, through its investigation, had reason to suspect the
hypothetical Sergeant Smith, it still would have the power to subpoena hun and to call on
the assistance of the court if he refused to testify. In concert with the court's power to hold
Smith in contempt if he chose not to comply with the order, and finally the ability to extend
a use immunity co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
the grand jury could effectively receive the desired testimony.
Under a projected privilege, the grand jury would have the same access without requiring
that the statement be subjected to subpoena, etc. This scheme, in theory, would protect the
interests of the grand jury to have a broad subpoena power, the department's power to
conduct internal investigations, and the officers' Fifth Amendment rights.
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inquisition is not to deprive the officer of her rights, but rather to
obtain information.
Professor Reitz emphasizes the fact that such a system does not
summarily abolish all the obligations of a defense attorney
The privilege is designed simply to inject Fifth Amendment is-
sues into consideration when defense lawyers are obliged to
come forward and supply active cooperation to the government.
The outcome of each case is a matter of less importance
than the fact that the result will be the same regardless of
whether the client or lawyer has been asked to come forward.2 36
This approach brings a greater measure of honesty to the taking
of Garrity statements. The internal affairs officer suddenly would
have the ability to carry out the promise made; namely, statements
given in the course of an investigation would not be used against
the officer. In this way, the discipline of officers could proceed in-
dependently of criminal proceedings with no threat of violation of
the participating officer's Fifth Amendment privilege. In addition,
neither the department nor the officer would need to depend on
the whim of the prosecutor or the trial court; either party could
assert the privilege with equal effectiveness.
PROTECTION OF GARRITY STATEMENTS AS A MATTER OF POLICY
The Truth in Constitutional Rights
Certainly, the criminal process- has as its ultimate end the
"truth." Many of the rights that the Court vigorously protects,
however, impair the ability of lower courts in their attempts to find
the truth.37 Professor Thomas Stacy classifies constitutional rights
accorded in criminal procedure as "truth-impairing" or "truth-fur-
thering."'238 He categorizes the privilege against self-incrimination
as a truth-furthering guarantee because of the general conception
that compelled confessions are less likely to be truthful than are
voluntary ones2 39 The privilege, however, also prevents the govern-
ment from arriving at the truth because the inadmissibility of co-
236. Reitz, supra note 20, at 652-53.
237. See Stacy, supra note 56, at 1370-71.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1376-77.
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erced statements complicates the information gathering process. 24°
In addition, one can envision a scenario where a witness gives a
coerced statement that is true, but the government has no other
source from which to collect or establish that fact in an admissible
form, thus barring the statement from entering the proceeding.
Although the exclusion of the statement clearly harms the gov-
ernment's case, the Fifth Amendment intentionally created this
impediment to preserve the rights of a defendant. For purposes of
finding the truth, attention must focus on how the Court attempts
to define a "coerced statement" or "compelled confession." Several
decisions point to a tendency to construe the coercion and involun-
tariness narrowly 241 In some instances where contents of a docu-
ment are at issue, the Court has determined that a particular
statement is not "testimonial" for Fifth Amendment purposes. 42
The Court may well use this sort of reasoning to protect internal
affairs files of a police department, and by analogy, allow the dis-
trict court to issue an order granting use immunity to the officer
that made the statements in the file and forcing her to testify
Social Concerns
The main policy concern is the ability of police departments to
conduct internal investigations while maintaimng the integrity of
their respective departments. If Garnty statements are routinely
admitted into grand jury hearings, the deterrent effect on internal
investigations would be at least twofold. First, the officers would
stop giving statements as a matter of course. The fear of retribu-
tion for "ratting" on a fellow officer and the subsequent inability
to depend on fellow officers for help would tear apart police de-
partments. Second, the rights of those officers who have already
240. Id. at 1377.
241. Id. at 1377-78. In his analysis, Professor Stacy cites Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157 (1986) (asserting that in order to hold a confession involuntary for purposes of the Due
Process Clause and the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court must find some coer-
cive activity on the part of law enforcement officials), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246, 1261-63 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding no coercion because of lack of
evidence of fear or forced detention where an inmate admitted to the murder of his daugh-
ter to an undercover FBI agent who the inmate believed to be a powerful underworld
figure).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (finding that although an
"act of production" privilege exists, the contents of those documents are not protected).
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given their statements under the expectation that the department
would and could protect them would be put in jeopardy 243 Per-
haps most importantly, the courts would set a frightening prece-
dent if they denied the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to those who assume as a career the protection of the
rights of others.
These interests must be balanced against those of the public.
Specifically, the rights of individual officers must not outweigh the
public interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal activity.
This interest is especially strong in the case of corruption in the
field of law enforcement. In fact, a relatively strong argument can
be made that internal investigations result in cover-ups more than
convictions or solutions. Therefore, anything that inhibits the in-
ternal investigatory function is positive for the public.
In the end, the balance must tip in favor of the officer. To justify
the infringement of an individual's fundamental rights for theoret-
ical gains is always a difficult venture. The American criminal jus-
tice system rests upon an "innocent until proven guilty" axiom. To
deviate from this course in the interest of "busting bad cops" ne-
glects the fact that officers must not receive "watered-down"244
versions of constitutional rights merely because their misdeeds
seem morally more egregious.
In the face of the verdict in the Rodney King trial and the out-
pouring of anger that followed, the easy path is that of untrammel-
led condemnation of the responsible police officers. Instead, the
courts and the public must be willing to permit the exercise of
Fifth Amendment rights in the hope that justice will follow and
that the innocent will receive the protection that the framers of
the Constitution intended for them.
243. A potential for equal protection problems may arise here, depending on the reading
of the statements themselves. No court has addressed this issue. Applying constitutional
analysis, the right burdened is a fundamental one, so the state likely would need to show a
compelling justification for the change in policy. The department may or may not convince
the court that the change serves the interest in criminal justice, but either way, the depart-
ment would have difficulty proving a need to make such a change effective retroactively.
244. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
A violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination occurs each time a grand jury successfully subpoenas
the internal affairs files of a police department without extending
immunity at least coextensive with that privilege. The Supreme
Court has allowed almost three decades to pass without revisiting
this particular issue;24 meanwhile, the law has evolved un-
supervised. Confusion exists in relation to how a court should ap-
ply the standards enunciated in Garrity and Gardner, and indeed
whether these cases should apply at all.246 For all intents and pur-
poses, Garnty and Gardner are still good law, and as such they
should be afforded consideration when reviewing a grand jury's
subpoena power over internal affairs files.
This consideration reveals concerns on two levels: first, the pro-
tection of the Fifth Amendment rights of police officers who have
placed their faith in the department when answering questions and
second, the promotion of exemplary integrity and lawfulness in the
police departments, the first line of defense against crime. In an
attempt to balance these interests, the most vital factor to remem-
ber is that officers should not receive a "watered-down version of
constitutional rights124 7 merely because they are law enforcement
officials. The protection of the individual against the use of coerced
statements "extends to all, whether they are policemen or other
members of our body politc. 248 The public correctly may hold po-
lice officers to a higher level of moral and legal responsibility in a
desire that they be role models for the community This goal
should not interfere with the fundamental right to be free from
self-incrimination.
To solve the dilemma, this Note has suggested that if the public
supports the continuation of internal investigations, the rest of the
legal system must acquiesce. If the system maintains the status
245. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (representing the most recent case in
which the Court heard arguments on these issues).
246. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jackson County Grand Jury v. Shinn, 835 S.W.2d 347, 349
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to inquire into the constitutional ramifications of the grand
jury subpoena of a Kansas City Police Department internal affairs file in enforcing the
grand jury's subpoena power).
247. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
248. Id.
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quo, prosecutors must realize that statements taken from officers
pursuant to Garrity would violate the Fifth Amendment if injected
into the criminal proceeding. Courts also must acknowledge that
the effect of permitting their use in grand jury hearings violates
the privilege in some circumstances. Even more beneficial would be
the statutory adoption of a "projected privilege" that would pro-
tect the statement from the time the officer speaks the words.
The time for a change has come. With increasing tension be-
tween police departments and the public, every effort to foster a
feeling of trust and honesty must be made. If officers believe courts
will violate their Fifth Amendment privilege as a reward for their
cooperation with the internal affairs division, they will be far less
inclined to assist the department in its efforts to self-police. Of-
ficers, for reasons of safety and mutual reliance, tend to want to
protect one another, making the job of investigating wrong-doing
much harder. Officers are acutely aware of any potential depriva-
tion of their rights, and will become more isolated and unified
against investigation if they believe that the courts and prosecutors
will treat them unfairly As this country tries to unravel the cloak
of mystery that envelops the Rodney King beating and the subse-
quent action against the officers for deprivation of civil rights, the
people will serve themselves well to ask how the Fifth Amendment
privilege might best serve the ends of justice for everyone, police
officers and citizens alike.
Andrew M. Herzig
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